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Abstract—Vehicular platooning is an emerging technology that
promises to save space on congested roadways, improve safety
and utilise less fuel for transporting goods, reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. This technology will draw the attention of attackers
seeking to profit or prove themselves to their peers by disrupting
the platoons. A platoon has several attack surfaces that attackers
can exploit to achieve their goals (either personal or financial).
This paper aims to discuss various attacks that the attackers
can launch against platoons by exploiting wireless communica-
tion weaknesses. Furthermore, we will present different known
strategies which are currently used to defend platoons from
attackers. This paper’s primary contribution we believe will help
new researchers in this domain, as well as automotive industries
and smart cities planners.
Index Terms—Platoons, Intelligent Transportation Systems,
Security, Cyber Attacks, Smart Cities, Communication Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, vehicular platooning has been considered a
promising technology to reduce fuel consumption, traffic con-
gestion and CO2 emissions [1]. As a specific application
of Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork (VANET), vehicles in a pla-
toon exchange information (such as locations, speeds) with
each other in different Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) wireless
communication modes such as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) [2]. In platoon, the leading
vehicle is called the leader and a vehicle following is known
as a member. A human driver always drives the lead vehicle to
control the platoon for safety reasons. The leader’s actions are
then transmitted to all platoon members via V2V, the members
will act upon the received information accordingly.
Due to wireless communication and broadcasting used in
platooning, communication in platoons is vulnerable to a wide
range of cyber attacks. Mainly, radio wireless signals such as
the IEEE 802.11p standard currently used are a point of attack
as it is an open standard. This means that it is easy to find
detailed information about the standard. Recent research has
identified several threats to platoons such as jamming attacks
[2], Sybil attacks [3] and ghost vehicles attacks [4]. Moreover,
various security mechanisms, including channel fading [5]
and witness-based key management [6] are also proposed to
address a few of the security threats facing platoons.
Several researchers investigate how to secure platoons from
various attacks [2], [5]–[10]; however, most of the research
discussed only a single attack. Moreover, few solutions to
tackle these attacks were also discussed. Further, various
survey papers exist in the literature, which focuses on different
types of attacks on Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
(CAVs) [11]–[13]. These papers provide a good picture of
attacks that can happen within CAV. However, majority of
these studies do not discuss attacks specifically for platoons.
This paper contributes to an understanding of the threat
landscape of communications within the vehicular platoons,
by studying its cybersecurity aspects. The main contribution is
three-fold: First, a survey for platoon communication security
is presented based on the existing peer-reviewed literature.
Second, threats and attacks are explicitly presented for platoon
communication by identifying various assets in the network.
Finally, we discuss security mechanisms and open challenges
to address such threats.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
will recall background knowledge on VANET and platooning.
Section III discusses security threats of platooning from the
literature. Relevant threats and attacks are systematically cate-
gorised in Sections IV and V. In Section VI, current methods
to these security issues of platooning will be discussed, along
with the open research challenges. Finally, Section VII will
conclude the paper and provide directions for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. VANET
VANET is an important application of the Internet of
Things (IoT) which is specifically designed to improve overall
transportation. This technology boasts the ability to make
travel on roads more efficient and safer [14]. VANET is
achieved by equipping road users with a variety of sensors
that are constantly monitoring the environment and the user
[15]. VANET communications work by the source vehicle
transmitting its message to all nearby nodes. These nodes will
then respond by re-transmitting the message, and so on.
B. Vehicular Platoons
Platooning is a specific application of VANET that uses both
manually driven and automatic self-drive vehicles together to
drive as close to each other as possible safely. Each vehicle can
get a significant boost to their fuel economy and, therefore,
save money and reduce the CO2 output of the vehicle [1].
By driving closer together, each vehicle uses less space on
the roads and therefore reduces congestion [1]. Vehicular
platoons work as all vehicles are linked together using wireless
communications to pass information between members. This
information includes speed, location, change in speed, and
direction [16]. This information allows all member vehicles in
the platoon automated driving by matching the lead vehicle’s
actions. Automated driving reduces the chances of an accident
due to reduction in human error [1]. This enables the vehicles
to travel at high speed in such close formations safely.
Platoons are made up of a leader, members and join/leavers,
where all vehicles are connected using a V2V wireless con-
nection. A human driver drives the lead vehicle, and this
vehicle’s actions and movements are then transmitted to all
platoon members. The members will act and behave upon the
wireless messages that they receive from the platoon leader.
Join/leave members when joining, are at the start, driven by
human drivers. However, once they are in a suitable and safe
position, they switch to automated driving; this is when a join
becomes a member [1], [17]. Likewise, the leaving vehicle will
be under automated control until it is safe for the driver to take
over. This describes the basic components of a platoon. Some
methods also look to use roadside units (RSUs) and other
infrastructure to improve connectivity and availability [16].
The platoon uses V2I communication to interact with RSU
and trusted authorities such as platoon enabling companies.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we acknowledge the related works in both
CAV and platoons. Security in platoons includes the physical
security, cybersecurity and respecting the privacy of the ve-
hicle [1]. Suppose if these security elements is compromised,
an attacker can use it to seek personal or financial gain from
it. For example, if the vehicle is left with the key unattended,
then the physical security is compromised. Likewise, suppose
the communication between two platooning vehicles is open
and not encrypted. In that case, attackers can eavesdrop on the
shared information, thus, compromising cybersecurity. In this
paper, only cybersecurity regarding wireless communications
will be considered, with some overlap with privacy.
Security is an important aspect of every network. In pla-
toons, securing the network assets and components is of
extreme importance because they share safety-critical infor-
mation between themselves. Thus, detecting and identifying
attacks in the platoon is very important. A vast amount of
research is carried in the field of network security, where
various attacks are identified for both VANET and CAV [11]–
[13], [18]–[22]. Further, the authors in [11], [12], [22] catego-
rized these attacks under five domains, including availability,
confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation.
Location privacy in vehicles is a big concern in both
VANET and platoon, especially when all applications use
navigational tools to plan and safely execute the journey [23],
[24]. This is often done using beaconing, which contains
confidential information about the transmitting vehicle. If an
attacker receives this information, it could be misused, which
ultimately will leave a drastic and massive impact on the
network. The information can be used to track vehicles, goods,
and vehicles’ drivers, leaving them open for exploitation.
Various mechanisms exist to address privacy attacks, including
pseudonymous authentications [25], short group signatures
[26] and random pseudonym updates [27].
Trust management is a significant part of any network, and
as such, it is also essential in VANET. There is a large amount
of research into trust management [6], [19], [28]. Most signifi-
cant properties in trust management are de-centralisation, real-
time constraints, information sparsity, scalability, privacy, and
robustness [29]. These trust models create trusted clusters of
nodes that communicate together. This works well in densely
populated areas but breaks down when the concentration of
nodes decreases [29]. Though trust is a significant component,
how trust can be integrated within platoons is largely missing
from the literature.
The automotive industry as a whole is having to look more
at cybersecurity as vehicles are becoming more computerised,
along with the introduction of self-driving vehicles and the
integration of the internet of things [30]. Users should also
make sure that robust authentication systems are put in place
to prevent access by attackers [30]. This includes Public
Key Infrastructures (PKI), Trusted Platform Modules (TPM),
OpenAuth 2.0 authentication mechanism, Pre-shared keys with
a challenge-response protocol and symmetric encryption [30].
Overall there is little relevant research carried out for
vehicular platoons. We aim to fill this gap by surveying various
security aspects of platoons and measures to secure them.
Further, we outline various challenges and further research.
IV. VEHICULAR PLATOONING SECURITY THREATS
There are several different cybersecurity threats that ve-
hicular platoon communications are facing. Some are direct,
trying to disrupt or damage a platoon’s integrity to make it less
efficient and cause discomfort to passengers. In contrast, others
will seek to break up or prevent platoons’ formation. Other
attacks could be more subtle and seek to steal information
about the users, vehicle, and load. Table I surveys literature
addressing state-of-the-art on platoons and VANETs.
Attack classification below uses a cryptography related clas-
sification [11], [22]. This was used as it is a recurring method
used in the VANETs. As platoons are a particular application
of a VANET, it is reasonable to use such classification.
A. Authenticity
Sybil attacks are one example, which compromises the
authenticity attribute by targeting the Leader, Members and the
RSU of a platoon. In such an attack, messages’ authenticity
becomes compromised as the attacker attacks from within the
platoon network [3]. The leader and RSU’s cannot identify
and distinguish between actual vehicles and a ghost vehicle.
Next, Global Positioning System (GPS) and Sensor spoofing
target individual platoon-enabled vehicles or RSU. Here, the
GPS signal can be spoofed to provide inaccurate information
about an individual’s location by overpowering the true signal
[13], [31]. Sensors are spoofed in various ways; one way is
to use malware to alter and change its outputs. The other is
to exploit weak points such as the tyre pressure monitoring
system, which could provide access to the Controller Area
Network (CAN) bus in many models [13], [21]. In many cases,
as they are so simple, they have no security features, which
makes them a tempting target for attackers [13], [31].
B. Integrity
Impersonation attacks compromise the integrity of many
assets in a platoon, such as leaders, members, RSUs and
trusted authorities. In this attack, an attacker will pretend to be
a legitimate user of the network using a stolen or forged ID.
While using such an ID, the attacker will gain the same access
to the network as the legitimate user had. Other members
will also treat the attacker as a legitimate user [6]. Replay
attacks compromise integrity of leaders, members, join/leave
and RSU by replaying old messages within the network. False
manoeuvre attacks target members and RSUs: a message to
perform a manoeuvre is fabricated and injected. This can cause
members to join or leave, resulting in manoeuvres when it is
unsafe to do so and for the platoon to split [17], [32].
C. Availability
Since critical information (such as Leader speed and lo-
cation) is being communicated with members in a platoon,
availability becomes a significant attribute. The availability
property of a platoon is compromised in several ways, but
all result in the members not using platooning services.
Jamming attacks target the V2V and V2I wireless connection
by filling the communication frequencies with random noise
[2]. Denial of service (DoS) attacks target join/leave and RSUs
by flooding platoons with requests which the system can not
clear fast enough [33]. Malware can be used in many ways.
One way is for it to target platoon-enabled vehicles, RSUs and
trusted authorities preventing use of legitimate services [13].
D. Confidentiality
The information communicated within the platoon may
contain private and confidential information, which should not
be revealed or accessed by the attacker. Eavesdropping breaks
confidentiality for both V2V and V2I communications. An
attacker can listen to the communication being transmitted
between the leader and members [34]. Impersonation appears
again as this time it affects RSUs, Trusted Authority and
platoon-enabled vehicles as an attacker could get information
that they are not meant to be able to [6].
V. PLATOONING COMMUNICATION SECURITY ATTACKS
This section discusses how attacks against vehicular platoon
wireless communication are carried out and what their effect
TABLE I
RELATED SURVEYS ADDRESSING CYBERSECURITY ASPECTS OF CAV, VANETS AND PLATOONS
Existing survey Key points and Ideas Attacks discussed in paper
Isaac et al., 2010
[18]
Detailed discussion of attacks. Structures the attacks and mecha-
nisms using cryptography related classification; Anonymity, Key
management, Privacy, Reputation and Location.
Brute force attacks, Misbehaving & malicious vehicles, Traffic
analysis attacks, Illusion attacks, Forging positions and Sybil
attacks false position disseminating.
Checkoway et al.,
2011 [21]
Investigation of different attack surfaces that are open to attack
on a vehicle, as such the attacks are classified by the range at
which the attacker needs to be to launch the attack. These are
Indirect physical access, Short-range wireless access and Long-
range wireless
The attacks are ways that an attacker can gain remote access to
the vehicle via CDs, Bluetooth, Remote Keyless entry, Infrared
ID and cellular signals as well as tyre pressure sensors.
AL-Kahtani et
al., 2012 [12]
Description of a variety of attacks with detailed explanation
of how they compromise networks. Few methods are presented
to protect against these attacks. While not structured by the
cryptography related classification like seen in [18] the attacks are
shown to what security requirement or attribute is broken. Includes
data integrity, authentication, availability and confidentiality.
Bogus Information, Denial-of-Service (DoS), Masquerading,
Blackhole, Malware, Spamming, Timing attack, GPS Spoofing,
Man-in-the-Middle, Sybil, Wormhole or Tunneling, Illusion
Attack, Impersonation.
Mejri et al., 2014
[22]
An outline of privacy and security challenges facing VANET
technology. Again the attacks are grouped together by security
requirement or attribute that is broken. These are Availability,
Authenticity and identification, Confidentiality, Integrity and data
trust and Non-repudiation/Accountability.
DoS, Jamming, Greedy behaviour, Malware, Broadcast tamper-
ing, Blackhole, Spamming, Eavesdrop, Sybil, GPS spoofing,
Masquerade, Replay, Tunneling, Key/Certificate replication, Po-
sition faking, Message alteration attacks, Information gathering,
Traffic analysis, Loss of event traceability.
Parkinson et al.,
2017 [13]
Consideration of a wide range of threats to CAVs and platoons.
The structure of the paper is laid out to discuss threats to vehicles,
human aspects and infrastructure.
Sensor Spoofing, jamming and DoS, Malware, FDI attacks on
CAN, TPMS attacks, Information theft, Location tracking, Bad




In-depth discussion around security and privacy of VANET which
includes attacks and mechanisms. while not used for structuring
the paper the attacks are also grouped together by security
requirement or attribute that is broken. These are Availability,
Authenticity, Confidentiality, Integrity and Non-repudiation.
DoS, Jamming, Malware, Broadcast tampering, black hole/ grey
hole, Greedy behaviour, Spamming, Eavesdrop, Traffic analysis,
Sybil, Tunneling, GPS spoofing, Freeriding, message falsifica-
tion/tampering, masquerade, replay and Repudiation attacks.
Harkness et al.,
2020 [19]
An investigation of the security of Intelligent Transport System
(ITS). Recommendations for securing test-beds are also provided
based on an in-depth analysis of risk.
Sensor spoofing and jamming, information theft, eavesdropping
and malware attacks on vehicles and infrastructure are investi-
gated as part of extensive risk assessments.
Hussain et al.,
2020 [20]
Security of VANETs for trust management. Identify up to date
open research questions in relation to trust management in
VANETs. Also discusses specifically REPLACE from [6] which
is a trust management system for platoons.
Attacks themselves are not discussed however there is a great
range of trust management methods that are discussed.
on the platoon. Table II summarizes the attacks specifically
within platoons along with a short summary.
TABLE II
THREATS TO PLATOONS AND A SUMMARY OF HOW THE ATTACK WILL
COMPROMISE THE PLATOON.
Attack name Short summary of the attack
Sybil attack [3],
[6]
Compromises authentication of the network by an
attacker within the platoon making ghost vehicles
that will try to get accepted into the platoon. Leads
to destabilisation and prevent members from joining.
Fake Maneuver
attack [17], [32]
Compromises the Integrity of the network by cre-
ating fake manoeuvre requests for members in the
platoon. This will destabilise and prevent users from
using the platoon by breaking it up into smaller
platoons or creating entrance gaps for nonexistent
vehicles. Members can also be removed.
Replay [2], [10] Compromises the Integrity of the network as an
attacker replays old messages into the network. This
makes the platoon unstable as members receive con-
flicting information.
Jamming [2] Compromises the Availability of the network as an
attacker seeks to prevent all communications on
platoon frequencies in the local area. As platoon
members can no longer communicate it will disband.
Eavesdropping
[34]
Compromises the Confidentiality of the network be-
cause an attacker is able to understand the informa-
tion transmitted within the platoon. This can lead to
data theft and privacy violation.
Denial Of Ser-
vice [33]
Compromises the Availability of the network by
preventing users from joining or creating a platoon.
Impersonation
[6]
Compromises the Integrity of the network by an at-
tacker posing as a different individual in the network.




Compromises authenticity and availability of sen-
sors. This is done using malware or directly attacking
the sensor which will lead to false sensing.
Malware [6], [13] Compromises the Availability of the network by pre-
venting users from being able to platoon. However,
malware can also be used to carry out other attacks
such as data theft, sensor spoofing and DoS attacks
on the vehicle itself.
A. Fake Data Injection (FDI) attacks
Fake Data Injection attacks are when an attacker injects
a packet of information into the wireless communication
channel. The packet can be created in several ways; the
simplest way is to record an old message and then replay
it. This kind of attack is called a Replay attack which is a
type of FDI attack. However, after recording the message, it
is possible that the attacker can edit or change the message to
there own advantage before transmitting the edited message.
Another way an attacker can carry out an FDI attack when
an attacker is part of a platoon. The attacker can deliberately
transmit false or miss leading information. An FDI attack does
not need to know the information they are injecting into the
platoon to disrupt it. Members of the platoon will react to
this information believing that it is from a legitimate source.
The goal of an attacker, in this case, is to make the platoon
unstable, reducing efficiency and forcing the platoon apart.
FDI attacks can be divided into the following subcategories.
1) Replay attacks: An attacker can inject old messages to
disrupt the normal operation of platoon. E.g., lead vehicle tells
member vehicle one to close the gap at X time. After a few
seconds, the leader tells member vehicle one to back off a
little. Suppose an attacker recorded the message transmitted at
time X and replayed that at time Y, which is after the leader
requested member vehicle one to back off. Member vehicle
one will now discount the previous message and instead, seek
to close the gap. If repeatedly done, then by replaying the
old message, the attacker will make the platoon oscillate as
members try to position themselves into the best positions
based on the information they receive [2], [10]. This can lead
to discomfort for the passenger’s and even vehicle collisions.
2) Sybil attacks: Sybil attacks on platoons happen when
a node pretends to present multiple nodes and uses it to
destabilise the platoon. To do this the attacker joins the platoon
and then creates multiple ghost vehicles that also request to
join the platoon. The presence of which will leave the platoon
with large gaps in it or for the platoon leader to think there
are more vehicles part of the platoon than there relay is.
3) Manoeuvre attacks: Platoon manoeuvre attacks include
fake entrance, fake leave, and fake split [32]. A fake entrance
request, if successful, will cause two vehicles to increase their
intermediate spacing. This gap allows in an entering vehicle.
However, if the request is fake, this gap could be created and
remain for an extended period before the platoon closes it
thus reducing the platoon’s efficiency. Fake leave and split
messages are capable of causing the most problems as they
can break down a platoon into individual members, which will
then need to reconnect, thus decreasing efficiency [17].
B. Jamming attacks
Jamming is possibly the most straightforward way for an
attacker to affect a platoon’s efficiently [2]. To jam communi-
cations, the attacker only has to know the frequency that the
platoon uses to disrupt or break it up. By flooding the commu-
nication frequencies with random noise and junk, it becomes
impossible for the platoon to maintain its communications
[2]. Therefore, this arises the chance of colision between the
members. All savings are lost by disbanding the platoon and
will continue to be so until the platoon can reform. Disruption
due to delay and accidents are also a risk.
C. Eavesdropping attacks
In this attack, the attacker listens in and takes information
from wireless communications [34]. While this kind of attack
does not directly disrupt the platoon or a platoon service
provider, it is still a concern. This attack’s primary goal is to
gain information from a platoon and/or member vehicles [34].
This information can then be used to carry out other attacks
such as replay and Sybil attacks. However, information can
be sold on to enable others to carry out these attacks. The
sold on information can also be GPS locations and tracking
information. If the platoon is travelling long distances, this
information may also include rest or overnight stops, which
criminals can use to target high-value goods on-board.
D. Denial Of Service attacks (DoS)
DoS attack can affect platoons in two ways. The first and
most obvious way is to attack the platoon supplier directly.
This is done by swamping them with more join requests then
they can handle and therefore shutting down the whole or parts
of their network. The second method of carrying out a DoS
attack will be on a single platoon. This is far more likely as
platoons will be limited to a maximum number of members.
This means an attacker does not need as much equipment to
carry out such an attack [33]. This attack will also be harder to
prevent. There is far less research into how such an attack can
be prevented than an attack on something as significant as a
fleet operator or platooning enabling company. The most likely
way this kind of attack will be carried out is by getting fake
or copied IDs to connect to make a platoon leader think that
there are far more members than there are. This will prevent
other members from connecting to the platoon leader.
E. Information Theft
All digital systems hold an incredible treasure trove of
information that is seen as desirable and valuable to many
people both for legal and illegal use [13]. Therefore a Vehicle
within a platoon will hold and transmit a variety of valuable
information. Some of the most common information that a
member vehicle will have and transmit will be information
about its starting location, destination and route. This infor-
mation can be used by criminals looking to steal or hijack the
vehicle and its cargo. A significant and more common threat
would be that any information from the vehicle and the driver
is then taken and sold on to third parties [13]. These third
parties can then use this information for their gain, such as
better advertisement [13]. One issue discussed in the literature
is who owns all this information: the driver, the fleet manager,
the platooning enabling company, or another entity. This is
something that will need to be established as companies can
seek to sell some information to third parties with or without
the user knowing, leading to privacy breaches.
F. Impersonation
Impersonation is when one user pretends to be another user.
This is carried out by an attacker being able to obtain the
identification of an innocent user. The consequences of this
kind of attack are that whatever the attacker does, others will
think it is the innocent user [6]. This will create a variety of
problems for the innocent user. The innocent user will likely be
subject to increased charges by a platooning enabling company
for extra usage, as well as not connecting or sudden dropouts
when the attacker uses their ID. This can also lead to a heavily
damaged reputation for the innocent user within the platoon
network leading to being unable to join or form a platoon and
even arrest and questioning for dangerous driving [6].
In many cases, when IDs are stolen, the information is
often sold on to others which can be used to give access to a
platooning service by a user that is not paying for it, banned,
or poorly rated drivers to access the platooning service [6].
G. GPS and Sensor Spoofing
While jamming a whole platoon can be done, it is far
easier for an attacker to jam individual sensors. Literature
shows that high powered torches and lasers can blind cameras
either partially or entirely [13]. One hurdle that needs to be
overcome is intense sunlight, which can also blind cameras
and leaves the vehicle blind. Any attack on the cameras will
leave the vehicle with blind spots. These blind spots can hide
dangers and hazards from the vehicle, not giving it enough
time to react, or it may fail to react at all. This can then lead
to incidents with other road users, leading to severe injury,
damage to vehicle and property.
Other ways that sensors can be attacked is through GPS
spoofing, which is done by an attacker copying the GPS trans-
missions and replaying them at a stronger signal from another
location, making the vehicle think it is elsewhere [31]. Such an
attack often starts very close to the victim vehicle. The attacker
needs to copy the victims’ GPS transmission and frequency.
After this, the attacker then increases the transmitter’s power
and can slowly start to move away from the victim, making
the victim GPS think that the attacker is the GPS source and
now follows them. This works as long as the attacker can
continuously transmit a higher-powered signal to the satellite
network. This works because the network always uses the
strongest signal. This is often the main transmission sent to
the network by the user. This type of attack will often lead
to the victim vehicle using the wrong GPS information and
therefore, not safely and effectively carrying out its journey.
Almost every sensor on a vehicle could be jammed. Com-
mon ones are the air pressure sensors in tyres [13]. In contrast,
attackers can spoof information and, in some cases, even send
completely fake messages pretending to be other systems on
the CAN network. Attacks can cause warnings of over or
under-inflation of the tyres to the driver, leaving them in a
dangerous state. An attack on the tyre pressure sensors can
cause constant alert’s and warnings to the driver. Suppose
the attacker can transmit anything they want over the CAN
network. In that case, the attack can be much more severe as
the attacker can compromise other systems and create multiple
problems that could lead to the vehicle’s catastrophic failure.
H. Malware attack
To carry out malware attacks, the attacker needs to access
the vehicles on-board computer. Sophisticated attackers will
use malware to ether rewrite firmware or give the hacker direct
access to the vehicle CAN network [13].
There are many ways that a vehicle can become infected
with malware. Direct access to the Onboard Diagnostic (OBD)
port is the easiest way for an attacker to access it. However, to
do this, the attacker will have to interact with the car directly.
In many cars, the OBDs are often exposed and easy to access
[13], making them easy targets. A remote attack using infected
multimedia files can be used to infect the on-board computer.
Such attacks work by first infecting a multimedia file which
can be done in several ways. This file could be on a phone, CD
or another device that can store information and is accessed
by the vehicle. From here, the malware can attack the vehicle,
bypassing most security. The second way of remote access
is through compromising any wireless transmissions to the
vehicle. These can be radio, Bluetooth or any other method of
wireless communications [13]. Such attacks are made in much
the same way as attacking a platoon. It is also possible to gain
access to far more than the initially compromised system and
more malicious attacks are then possible.
VI. SECURITY MECHANISMS AND OPEN CHALLENGES
In this section, we will discuss few security mechanisms to
secure wireless communications of vehicular platoons. Further,
we also outline few open challenges in this section.
A. Security Mechanisms
There is a wide range of proposed security mechanisms
discussed to cover a range of attacks on platoons. Table III
introduces each security mechanism and what it can help
prevent against before giving a small summary of the open
challenge with this method.
TABLE III
MITIGATING EFFECTS OF ATTACKS ON PLATOONS AND OPEN CHALLENGES
Security Mecha-
nism






Large scale testing of current
methods of key creation and
distribution to compare effec-






More research into RSU net-
work security and identifica-





Where in the network is the







The use of VLC and wire-
less radio communications be-






Most effective means to de-
ploy such security measures
without affecting response.
1) Private and Public Keys: Public key infrastructure (PKI)
is used to secure a network using a single key that all network
members will use. Such keys may change periodically, but all
network nodes will know or be told the following key. This
is useful for preventing an attacker outside the network from
eavesdrop, stealing data, or quickly injecting false data [5],
[8]. However, this is not a perfect solution as an attacker in
the network can still carry out attacks.
Both public and private keys work in the same way as
they encode a message with predetermined algorithms. Such
algorithms will also add signatures and timestamps to the
messages to further improve security and preventing replay
attacks. When linked to secure user IDs, private keys ex-
pressly can successfully prevent DoS, Sybil, fake manoeuvre
messages [5], [8] and in VANETs man-in-the-middle attacks
[12]. However, the major challenge in this scenario is how
the members exchange keys in the presence of the attacker
secretly? One proposed method for this in platooning is
to use quantized fading channel randomness [5]. Quantized
fading channel randomness works by taking advantage of
the nature of multi-path fading to quickly create identical
private keys without having to transmit the key. The system
is resistant to eavesdroppers trying to steal the key as the
eavesdropper pathway is different from that of a legitimate
user. Therefore, the fading will be different [5], thus making
it extremely difficult for an attacker to steal the private key.
The implementation of this technique requires more equipment
to be mounted to a vehicle to enable this. RSU’s can be used
too and act as middlemen in exchanging private keys between
members; however, more roadside infrastructure needs to be
installed. When using keys, there needs to be an easy, cost-
effective way to distribute them securely. They then need to be
kept secure as keys only secure the message until the attacker
gains access to the key.
2) Roadside Units: Another way to coordinate platoons and
private and public keys is to use the adjacent infrastructure
of the network, i.e., RSU as they can provide a contact
point between platooning vehicles, road users and companies
providing platoon services [8]. The advantage of using RSUs
is two-fold. They can serve as middlemen to communicate up-
to-date information to vehicles and the TA, enabling improved
connectivity. Also, they can monitor the driver’s behaviour
within the platoon network, which can ultimately enable to
detect various attacks, including impersonation attacks.
They can be used to issue secret keys to individuals seeking
to communicate directly with each other, such as being part of
a platoon. In this capacity, the RSUs are used as intermediaries
between connected vehicles and a trusted authority [35]. The
RSU has limited authority. Its primary role is to distribute
secret keys to authorised users to communicate with each other
[8]. This setup gives the trusted authority much better control
over who has the security key and updating the keys so that
anomalous users can be screened out faster.
RSUs are still susceptible to damage, failure and attack
themselves. The open challenge with them is identifying and
removing faulty RSUs quickly and reliably, without damaging
the network overall. Another open challenge is how to handle
areas of the network with a low density of RSUs where
platoons can not rely on them to update them from a TA.
3) Control Algorithm’s: Detecting abnormal behaviour of
drivers is a major research domain in platoons. One method
currently being investigated is to use control algorithms, which
can only reduce the impact of the attack on a platoon [7].
This technique is effective against Sybil, replay and manoeu-
vre attacks as the algorithms can spot potentially damaging
behaviours and communications caused by these attacks [6],
[7]. The control algorithm constantly communicates with the
on-board sensors to prevent such attacks on platoons. One way
to use a control algorithm is to use the Lyapunov–Krasovskii
approach [7], which reduces the effect of different attacks.
Control algorithm’s and private keys are often the go-
to for preventing Sybil, replay and manoeuvre attacks [2],
[9], [10]. This is because they are code-based and can be
updated and changed at a low cost. In some cases, the control
algorithms rely on encryption techniques to authenticate the
source codes and legitimacy. These methods make it more
challenging to carry out an FDI attack. The receiver can
distinguish between messages from other platoon members
and fake ones. This approach can significantly increase the
security of the platoon [2], [9], [10] as they can be used
to screen out attacks where the attacker is trying to insert
information into a communication channel. Control algorithms
can also be used on CAN bus to prevent sensor spoofing [13].
Vehicular Platoon Disruption (VPD) attacks [10] disrupt
natural movements and flow of a platoon. Examples of such
attacks would be any FDI attack, GPS and sensor spoofing
and jamming attacks or any combination of these attacks.
VPD attack detection algorithms (VPD-ADA) [10] help reduce
this risk by monitoring the position of members, periodically
checking the positional information from other vehicles to
make sure they are part of the platoon. The positional informa-
tion is gathered from multiple sources such as Light Detection
and Ranging (LiDAR) systems and or GPS sensor data from
other platoon members to confirm location information. When
calculated, the sensor information can show any discrepancies
in information passed between the platoon members. It is also
effective at reducing the impact of false manoeuvre requests.
As platoon communications are processed and acted upon
quickly to keep the platoon safe and stable, any additional
steps will slow this process down. Therefore there needs
research on the best way to use such algorithms within
platooning without adversely affecting performance.
4) Hybrid Communication: Another way to prevent an
attack on a platoon is to use radio waves and visible light
to prevent jamming attacks. A hybrid system can prevent
Jamming and FDI attacks on platoons by using a second
channel to receive and confirm the information [2]. The small
inter-spacing between members of a platoon makes it ideal
for visible light communications. There is a slight chance
for interference from external light to block the communi-
cation. By implementing both visible light and IEEE 802.11p,
Secure Platoon Visible Light Communication (SP-VLC) can
be utilized [2]. According to this protocol, the platoon uses
a hybrid communication pattern to communicate between
platoon members. To carry out any action, each member of
the platoon must receive both visible light transmission and
an 802.11p transmission to carry out any action. Suppose
jamming of the wireless communication on 802.11p occurs. In
that case, it will switch to using visible light only until a secure
connection can be re-established. Visible light communications
will directly combat jamming and spoofing attacks by not
relying on just one communication type. Further, instead of
visible light communication, 3GPP C-V2X communication
can be used along with IEEE 802.11p to prevent jamming [36].
5) Securing On-board Systems: Attacks on individuals can
be prevented in the same ways as discussed previously by
using control algorithms and secret keys [2], [9], [10] as
discussed earlier. However, preventing direct spoofing and
jamming attacks on sensors can be reduced by using multiple
sensors and developing efficient algorithms to detect and
highlight potential attacks. Finally, an infected file can be
hard to pin down; however, simple antivirus on the On-
board computer system and not downloading from unautho-
rized sources can reduce the chance of such an attack being
successful. On-board computers and systems should also use
firewalls and only allow components to communicate with
what they need to. These measures will help prevent attackers
from compromising one component and then affect the whole
system. Additional research will need to be done to highlight
where the most effective place is to deploy such algorithms.
B. Open Challenges to Vehicular Platoon Security
1) Variety of Attacks on Vehicular Platoons: Currently,
the scope of attacks studied or investigated specifically for
platoons is minimal, i.e., Sybil attacks, jamming, eavesdropper
and malware attacks, to name a few. However, over time, new
attacks are introduced. Therefore, research is required to test
platoons against these new attacks. Further designing security
solutions to these attacks is an open challenge that needs to
be addressed to secure platoons.
2) Ensuring Privacy in Vehicular Platoons: Ensuring pri-
vacy within the platoon itself is highly challenging since
members use wireless communication to share messages,
which can be interpreted and eavesdropped on by the attackers.
Further, platoon members may want to keep their credentials
and essential information confidential and private. Therefore,
ensuring privacy is an open-ended challenge that needs to be
tackled to gain members trust to be part of a platoon.
3) Maintaining Trust in Vehicular Platoons: Trust plays a
vital role in platoons as they can increase network security.
Mainly, it allows the propagation of authentic information
between platoon members in a trusted environment. However,
ensuring trust in the platoons is a challenge as the members
need to evaluate the messages’ authenticity in a brief period of
time. In case the member is unable to evaluate the messages’
trustworthiness, it can have a drastic impact on the platoon.
Therefore, trust management is an important challenge which
needs to be addressed to increase network security.
4) Suitable Risk Assessment Framework in Vehicular Pla-
toons: Risk assessment is a significant component of platoon
security which identifies the impact of the attacks, according
to their risk. Various standards are available to perform a risk
assessment in VANET, such as SAE J3061 [37] and ISO/SAE
21434 [38]. However, how these standards will be applied
within the platoons to perform risk assessment is an open
challenge that needs to be performed in order to identify and
classify attacks according to their risks.
5) Lack of Suitable Real World Testbeds for Vehicular
Platoons: Platoon modelling is validated using digital twins
such as Plexe [39] and VENTOS [40] simulations platforms.
Though simulations can help some insight into the risks arising
from an attack, and design novel security mechanisms, the
results produced are not always realistic. To ensure system-
level security for platoons, any proposed mechanism needs to
be demonstrated on real-world testbeds, which remains costly.
VII. CONCLUSION
As vehicular platooning is still an emerging technology,
many questions remain unanswered. The advantages of pla-
tooning are clear and well researched; however cybersecurity
aspects of wireless communication in platoon is limited. This
paper has looked at the current research on communication
security risks to platoons. To that end, there is research into
the use of secret and public keys to secure platoons and
how to distribute them privately and defence against Sybil
attacks. There is research into the use of witness systems and
sensors to prove members credentials and locations. These
have also been presented as a way to prevent Sybil and ghost
vehicle attacks. This paper has shown that there has been some
research into different types of attack on platoons. However,
there are still many research gaps, such as risk assessments
that look objectively at differing attacks on vehicular platoons.
By looking into the possible attacks on platoons, it is clear
that compared to VANET, there has been little research into
the effects and prevention mechanisms. This would seem to
provide fertile ground for new research opportunities.
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